

DEINDE CONSIDERANDUM est de his quæ absolute ad voluntatem Dei pertinent. In parte autem appetitiva inveniuntur in nobis et passiones animæ, ut gaudium, amor, et hujusmodi, et habitus moralium virtutum, ut justitia, fortitudo, et hujusmodi. Unde

primo considerabimus de amore Dei;  
secundo de justitia et misericordia ejus.

## Quæstio 20. de amore Dei

Circa primum quærentur quatuor:

1. utrum in Deo sit amor;
2. utrum amet omnia;
3. utrum magis amet unum quam aliud;
4. utrum meliora magis amet.

### articulus 1. utrum amor sit in Deo

AD PRIMUM sic proceditur:<sup>1</sup> 1. Videtur quod amor non sit in Deo. Nulla enim passio est in Deo. Amor autem est passio. Ergo amor non est in Deo.

2. Præterea, amor, ira, tristitia et hujusmodi contra se dividuntur. Sed tristitia et ira non dicuntur de Deo nisi metaphoricè. Ergo nec amor.

3. Præterea, Dionysius dicit,<sup>2</sup> *Amor est vis unitiva et concretiva*. Hoc autem in Deo locum habere non potest, cum sit simplex. Ergo in Deo non est amor.

SED CONTRA est quod dicitur 1 *Joan.*<sup>3</sup> *Deus caritas est.*

RESPONSIO: Dicendum quod necesse est ponere amorem in Deo. Primus enim motus voluntatis et cujuslibet appetitivæ virtutis est amor. Cum enim actus voluntatis et cujuslibet appetitivæ virtutis tendat in bonum et malum sicut in propria objecta, bonum autem principalius et per se sit objectum voluntatis et appetitus, malum autem secundario, et per aliud, in quantum scilicet opponitur bono, oportet naturaliter esse priores actus

<sup>1</sup>cf Ia. 82, 5 ad 1. CG I, 91; IV, 19. III Sent. 32, 1 ad 1. In De div. nom. 4, lect. 9.

<sup>2</sup>De divinis nominibus 4. PG 3, 713. St Thomas, lect. 9

<sup>3</sup>1 John 4, 16

<sup>4</sup>Habits: not what they have come to mean in English as when we speak of set or fixed 'habits', but enhanced qualities of activity. Good habits, or virtues, are steady and developing bearings or trainings towards the utmost of which a power is capable, a self-possession or holding of oneself for what is best. St Thomas lifts

WE GO ON TO CONSIDER qualities attributed purely to God's will. In our appetitive part we find both the emotions, like love, joy, and the rest, as well as the habits<sup>a</sup> of the moral virtues, like justice, fortitude, and the rest. So we shall examine,

first, God's love (20);  
secondly, his justice and mercy (21).

## Question 20. love in God

Here there are four points of inquiry:

1. whether there is love in God;
2. whether he loves all things;
3. whether he loves one more than another;
4. whether he loves the better the more.

### article 1. has God love?

THE FIRST POINT:<sup>1</sup> 1. No, apparently. There is no feeling in God, and love is a feeling. Hence love is not in God.

2. Moreover, love and grief and anger and so forth are divisions of the same class. Yet grief and anger are not attributed to God save by metaphor. Nor, then, is real love.

3. Furthermore, Dionysius says, *Love is a joining and binding force.*<sup>2</sup> How can this find place in God, since he is simple? How, therefore, can loving?

ON THE OTHER HAND there is St John writing, *God is love.*<sup>3b</sup>

REPLY: We have to hold there is love in God. For the first motion of will, indeed of any power of appetite, is love. The activities of these powers make for good or evil, for these are their proper objectives; good as being the more principal and the direct objective of will and appetite, evil as being secondary and because of something else which then and there is the opposite of a good.<sup>c</sup> Consequently acts of will and appetite bent on a good

the dynamic psychology and ethics of Aristotle into the moral theology of grace: 122æ. 49-70, Vols. 22, 23 & 24 of this series.

<sup>b</sup>Not just *philia* or *eros*, but *agape*, a word introduced by Christian writers; for St Thomas it signifies not desire, not benevolence, but friendship, *amicitia*, or sharing; cf 222æ. 23, 1.

<sup>c</sup>cf above Ia. 19, 9.

voluntatis et appetitus qui respiciunt bonum eis qui respiciunt malum, ut gaudium quam tristitiam, et amorem quam odium. Semper enim quod est per se prius est eo quod est per aliud.

Rursus quod est communius naturaliter est prius; unde et intellectus per prius habet ordinem ad verum commune quam ad particularia quædam vera. Sunt autem quidam actus voluntatis et appetitus respicientes bonum sub aliqua speciali conditione, sicut gaudium est de bono præsentis et habitu, desiderium autem et spes de bono nondum adeptis. Amor autem respicit bonum in communi, sive sit habitum sive non habitum; unde amor naturaliter est primus actus voluntatis et appetitus.

Et propter hoc omnes alii motus appetitivi præsupponunt amorem quasi primam radicem. Nullus enim desiderat aliquid nisi bonum amatum; neque aliquis gaudet nisi de bono amato. Odium etiam non est nisi de eo quod contrariatur rei amata; et similiter tristitiam, et cætera huiusmodi, manifestum est in amore referri sicut in primum principium.

Unde in quocumque est voluntas, vel appetitus, oportet esse amorem. Remoto enim primo, removentur alia. Ostensum est autem<sup>4</sup> in Deo esse voluntatem; unde necesse est in eo ponere amorem.

1. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod vis cognoscitiva non movet nisi mediante appetitiva; et sicut in nobis ratio universalis movet mediante ratione particulari, ut dicitur in *De Anima*,<sup>5</sup> ita appetitus intellectivus, qui dicitur voluntas, movet in nobis mediante appetitu sensitivo; unde proximum motivum corporis in nobis est appetitus sensitivus. Unde semper actum appetitus sensitivi concomitatur aliqua transmutatio corporis, et maxime circa cor, quod est primum principium motus in animali, ut Philosophus dicit.<sup>6</sup> Sic igitur actus appetitus sensitivi, in quantum habent transmutationem corporalem annexam, passionibus dicuntur, non autem actus voluntatis. Amor igitur, et gaudium et delectatio, secundum quod significant actus appetitus sensitivi, passionibus sunt; non autem secundum quod significant actus appetitus intellectivi; et sic ponuntur in Deo. Unde dicit Philosophus<sup>7</sup> quod *Deus una et simplici operatione gaudet et eadem ratione sine passione amat*.

<sup>4</sup>Ia. 19, 1

<sup>5</sup>*De Anima* III, II. 434a20. St Thomas, *lect.* 16

<sup>6</sup>*De partibus animalium* II, 1, & III, 4; 647a30 & 666a35

<sup>7</sup>*Ethics* VII, 14. 1154b26. St Thomas, *lect.* 14

<sup>8</sup>Love is treated in 1a2æ. 26-28 (itself, its cause, its effects), delight, *delectatio* in 1a2æ. 31-4: though ostensibly under the headings of a treatise on the emotions, or passions of the sensitive appetite, the discussions range far beyond this limitation and touch on the deathlessness of love and the eternity in delight. The present article makes the point that these two, unlike other emotions, such as hate or anger for instance, can be treated in their purity apart from organic changes, and therefore can be properly, and not merely by metaphor, be attributed to God.

are prior in the nature of things to those going for an evil, which is why love is more fundamental than hate, and joy than sadness, for always what is of itself comes before what is because of another.<sup>4</sup>

Again, what is more universal comes first by nature, thus the intelligence is related to truth as such before it bears on particular truths. Now some activities of will and appetite are engaged with good qualified by certain conditions, thus joy and delight are with a good that is present and held, desire and hope with a good not yet possessed. Love, however, is for what is good and simply so,<sup>5</sup> unqualified by whether it is possessed or not. Hence of its nature it starts all activity of appetite and will.

Consequently all other motions of appetite and will presuppose love; it is like their very root. No one desires an object or rejoices in it unless it be a good that is loved. Nor is there any hatred except for what is contrary to a thing loved, and the same applies to grief and the rest: they all come back to love as to their primordial source.

On this account wherever there is appetite or will there must be love; take away the foundation and nothing else is left. We have shown that there is will in God,<sup>4</sup> and therefore we must affirm that there is love in him as well.

Hence: 1. A cognitive power does not set things in motion except through an appetitive power. As our abstract reason works through our sense of fact,<sup>1</sup> a fact noted by Aristotle,<sup>5</sup> so also the intelligent appetite, which is called the will, works through our emotional wants. Sensitive appetite is the proximate moving principle for animal bodies. Its activity is always accompanied by bodily change, especially round the heart, the prime vital organ of animal life according to Aristotle.<sup>6</sup>

That is why activities of the sense appetite, because they are bound up with bodily changes, are called passions or emotions, which is not the case with activities of will. Loving, enjoying and delighting are emotions when they signify activities of the sensitive appetite; not so, however, when they signify activities of intelligent appetite. It is in this last sense that they are attributed to God. Aristotle says that God rejoices in one simple activity,<sup>7</sup> and for this same reason he loves without passion.

<sup>5</sup>Love is for *bonum in communi*; here means, says Cajetan, *bonum absolute*, good pure and simple, not *bonum universale*, goodness in general. The argument is that the simple and unqualified is prior to the composite or mixed.

<sup>1</sup>Sense of fact, *ratio particularis*, in contrast to *ratio universalis*; cf *In De anima* III, *lect.* 16. Aristotle is arguing that the particular, not the universal, originates movement; as in the minor premise of the practical syllogism—this and this kind of action should be done, but *this* is an act of the kind meant, and therefore, etc. See also Ia. 78, 4; 81, 3. 1a2æ. 30, 3 ad 3; 51, 3.

<sup>6</sup>Aristotle, 'God always enjoys a single and simple pleasure, for there is not only an activity of movement but an activity of immobility.' cf above Ia. 19, 1 ad 3.

2. Ad secundum dicendum quod in passionibus sensitivi appetitus est considerare aliquid quasi materiale, scilicet corporalem transmutationem, et aliquid quasi formale, quod est ex parte appetitus; sicut in ira, ut dicitur in I *De Anima*,<sup>8</sup> materiale est ascensio sanguinis circa cor, vel aliquid huiusmodi; formale vero appetitus vindictæ. Sed rursus ex parte ejus quod est formale, in quibusdam horum designatur aliqua imperfectio, sicut in desiderio, quod est boni non habiti, et in tristitia, quæ est mali habiti; et eadem ratio est de ira, quæ tristitiam supponit. Quædam vero nullam imperfectionem designant, ut amor et gaudium. Cum igitur nihil eorum Deo conveniat secundum illud quod est materiale, ut dictum est,<sup>9</sup> illa quæ imperfectionem important etiam formaliter Deo convenire non possunt nisi metaphorice propter similitudinem effectus, ut supra dictum est.<sup>10</sup> Quæ autem imperfectionem non important de Deo proprie dicuntur, ut amor et gaudium; tamen sine passione, ut dictum est.<sup>11</sup>

3. Ad tertium dicendum quod actus amoris semper tendit in duo, scilicet in bonum quod quis vult alicui, et in eum cui vult bonum. Hoc enim est proprie amare aliquem velle ei bonum. Unde in eo quod aliquis amat se vult bonum sibi; et sic illud bonum quærit sibi venire in quantum potest. Et pro tanto dicitur amor vis unitiva etiam in Deo, sed absque compositione; quia illud bonum quod vult sibi non est aliud quam ipse, qui est per suam essentiam bonus, ut supra ostensum est.<sup>12</sup>

In hoc vero quod aliquis amat alium vult bonum illi; et sic utitur eo tanquam se ipso, referens bonum ad illum sicut ad se ipsum. Et pro tanto dicitur amor vis concretiva quia alium aggregat sibi, habens se ad eum sicut ad se ipsum. Et sic etiam amor divinus est vis concretiva, absque compositione quæ sit in Deo, in quantum aliis bona vult.

*articulus 2. utrum Deus omnia amet*

AD SECUNDUM sic proceditur:<sup>1</sup> I. Videtur quod Deus non omnia amet. Quia secundum Dionysium,<sup>2</sup> *amor amantem extra se ponit; et eum quodam-*

<sup>8</sup>*De Anima* I, I. 403a30. St Thomas, *lect. 2*

<sup>9</sup>Answer to first argument

<sup>10</sup>Ia. 3, 2 ad 2; 19, 11

<sup>11</sup>Answer to first argument

<sup>12</sup>Ia. 6, 3

<sup>1</sup>cf Ia. 23, 3 ad 1; Ia2æ. 110, I. CG I, 91; III, 50. *De veritate* xxvii, I. In *De div. nom.* 4, *lect.* 9. In *Joan.* 5, *lect.* 10. II *Sent.* 26, 1; III, 32, 1 & 2. *De caritate* 7 ad 2. Also Ia2æ. 31, 2, on time in delight; Ia2æ. 32, 2, on movement and delight. Recall that activity as such is 'quiet' and 'immobile'; cf *In Physic.* III, *lect.* 4; VIII, *lect.* 9. In *De anima* III, *lect.* 12. Ia. 18, 3 ad 1. Above Ia. 19, 1 note g.

<sup>2</sup>*De divinis nominibus* 4. PG 3, 712. St Thomas, *lect.* 10

2. In an emotion of the sensitive appetite we can distinguish between the quasi-material element or bodily change and the quasi-formal element of a voluntary appetite as such. Thus, as noted by Aristotle,<sup>8</sup> the first is physiological, the surging of blood to the heart or something of the sort, while the second is psychological, namely the passion, let us say, to contend or avenge.<sup>h</sup> Now in some passions this formal element implies an imperfection; thus desire is for a good not yet possessed, and grief is about an evil that is present, and likewise with anger which supposes grief. But others, for instance love and joy, imply no such imperfection.

Since none of these emotions is attributed to God with regard to what is material or physiological in them, and this we have seen,<sup>9</sup> and since those of which the forms imply a lack of achievement cannot be attributed to him except metaphorically, namely by a likeness in their effect, and this also we have explained,<sup>10</sup> it remains that those only of which the formal meaning implies no incompleteness can properly be attributed to God. Love and joy have this character. Yet, as we have noted,<sup>11</sup> in him they are passionless.

3. The motion of love goes always to these two terms, namely the good willed to someone and the someone to whom it is willed. Loving someone properly is willing him good. Hence in loving yourself you are willing yourself good, for you seek to join yourself with a good as much as you can. To that extent is love called a joining force, even in God, though without implying composition, for the good he wills himself is nothing other than himself, who is good of his essence, as we have already shown.<sup>12</sup>

By loving another you will good to him, and treat him as yourself: good for him is good for you. Indeed love is called a binding force because it joins you and another whom you hold as you hold yourself.<sup>1</sup> Thus also is divine love a binding force, though without spelling any composition in God, for it is to others that he wills good.

*article 2. does God love everything?*

THE SECOND POINT:<sup>1</sup> I. Not everything, it seems. According to Dionysius,<sup>2</sup> *Love carries the lover outside himself, and transports him somehow into the*

<sup>h</sup>The passions for contending and avenging are rooted in the *irascibile*; Ia2æ. 40-8, Vol. 21 of this series. Their control by the cardinal virtue of fortitude. 2a2æ. 123-40, Vol. 42.

<sup>1</sup>*Amor est vis unitiva et concretiva*, the terms come from Dionysius, cf Ia2æ. 28, 1 & 2. We are united to God, but the reciprocity is not such that we speak of God being united to us. In creatures the relation to God is real, Ia. 4, 3; 45, 3, but in God the only relations that are real are those that for theology constitute the Persons of the Trinity, Ia. 13, 7; 28, 1.

*modo in amatum transfert.* Inconveniens autem est dicere quod Deus extra se positus in alia transferatur. Ergo inconveniens est dicere quod Deus alia a se amet.

2. Præterea, amor Dei æternus est. Sed ea quæ sunt alia a Deo, non sunt ab æterno nisi in Deo. Ergo Deus non amat ea nisi in se ipso. Sed secundum quod sunt in eo, non sunt aliud ab eo. Ergo Deus non amat alia a se ipso.

3. Præterea, duplex est amor, scilicet concupiscentiæ et amicitia; sed Deus creaturas irracionales non amat amore concupiscentiæ, quia nullius extra se eget; nec etiam amore amicitia, quia non potest ad res irracionales haberi, ut patet per Philosophum in *Ethic.*<sup>3</sup> Ergo Deus non omnia amat.

4. Præterea, in *Psalms.*<sup>4</sup> dicitur, *Odisti omnes qui operantur iniquitatem.* Nihil autem simul odio habetur et amatur. Ergo Deus non omnia amat.

SED CONTRA est quod dicitur *Sap.*,<sup>5</sup> *Diligis omnia quæ sunt, et nihil odisti eorum quæ fecisti.*

RESPONSIO: Dicendum quod Deus omnia existentia amat; nam omnia existentia in quantum sunt bona sunt. Ipsum enim esse cujuslibet rei quoddam bonum est, et similiter quælibet perfectio ipsius. Ostensum est autem supra,<sup>6</sup> quod voluntas Dei est causa omnium rerum; et sic oportet quod intantum habeat aliquid esse aut quodcumque bonum in quantum est volitum a Deo. Cuilibet igitur existenti Deus vult aliquod bonum. Unde cum amare nil aliud sit quam velle bonum alicui, manifestum est quod Deus omnia quæ sunt amat.

Non tamen eo modo sicut nos. Quia enim voluntas nostra non est causa bonitatis rerum, sed ab ea movetur sicut ab objecto, amor noster, quo bonum alicui volumus, non est causa bonitatis ipsius, sed e converso bonitas ejus, vel vera vel æstimata, provocat amorem, quo ei volumus et bonum conservari quod habet, et addi quod non habet; et ut ad hoc operemur.

Sed amor Dei est infundens et creans bonitatem in rebus.

1. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod amans sic fit extra se in amatum translatus in quantum vult amato bonum, et operatur per suam providentiam, sicut et sibi. Unde dicit Dionysius,<sup>7</sup> *Audendum est autem et hoc pro*

<sup>3</sup>*Ethics VIII, II. 1155b27. St Thomas, lect. 11*

<sup>4</sup>*Psalms 5, 5*

<sup>5</sup>*Wisdom 11, 20*

<sup>6</sup>Ia. 19, 4

<sup>7</sup>*De divinis nominibus 4. PG 3, 712. St Thomas, lect. 10*

*beloved.* It is straining language to speak of God being carried and transported outside himself, and so also it is to speak of him loving things other than himself.

2. Again, God's love is everlasting. Yet things other than God are not everlasting except in God. He does not love them, then, except as in himself. As such they are not other than himself. Hence God does not love anything other than himself.

3. Besides, love has two meanings, desire and friendship. God does not love non-rational creatures with the love of desire, for he needs nothing outside himself; nor with the love of friendship, for this, as Aristotle points out,<sup>3</sup> cannot be shared with non-rational things. Therefore God does not love everything.

4. Then also, in the *Psalms* it is said, *Thou hatest all workers of iniquity.*<sup>4</sup> Nothing can be held in love and hate at the same time. Consequently God does not love everything.

ON THE OTHER HAND there is *Wisdom* saying,<sup>5</sup> *You love all the things that exist and hate none of the things you have made.*<sup>a</sup>

REPLY: God loves all existing things. For in so far as it is real each is good; the very existence of each single thing is good, and so also is whatever it rises to. We have already shown that God's will is the cause of things,<sup>6</sup> and consequently that in so far as it has reality or any goodness at all each thing must needs be willed by God. God therefore wills some good to each existing thing, and since loving is no other than willing good to someone,<sup>b</sup> it is clear that God loves everything.

Yet not as we do. For since our will is not the cause of things being good but responds to that goodness as to its objective, our love in willing good for a thing is not the cause of that goodness. Instead its goodness, real or only imagined, evokes our love, which cherishes the dearness it possesses and wishes it to gain that which it is yet to have; to this purpose we bend our energies. God's love, however, pours out and creates the goodness in things.

Hence: 1. The lover is so transported outside himself into the beloved as to will the good of the beloved, and effectively to provide for it, as though for himself. That is why Dionysius says,<sup>7</sup> *We dare to affirm, the truth com-*

<sup>a</sup>Biblical language which speaks of God's hating is metaphorical, and refers to his *voluntas signi*, cf above Ia. 19, 12; also below on reprobation, Ia. 23, 3 ad 1.

<sup>b</sup>Willing good to someone: *benevolentia*, cf 2a2æ. 27, 2. Love is 'nothing else', *nil aliud*, so perhaps in a purely ethical system of reference. But St Thomas's own theological doctrine of friendship and charity look beyond simple well-wishing.

*veritate dicere, quod et ipse omnium causa per abundantiam amativæ bonitatis extra se ipsum fit ad omnia existentiæ providentiis.*

2. Ad secundum dicendum quod, licet creaturæ ab æterno non fuerint nisi in Deo, tamen per hoc quod ab æterno in Deo fuerunt ab æterno Deus cognovit res in propriis naturis, et eadem ratione amavit. Sicut et nos per similitudines rerum quæ in nobis sunt cognoscimus res in se ipsis existentes.

3. Ad tertium dicendum quod amicitia non potest haberi nisi ad rationales creaturas, in quibus contingit esse redamationem et communicationem in operibus vitæ, et quibus contingit bene evenire vel male secundum fortunam et felicitatem; sicut et ad eas proprie benevolentia est. Creaturæ autem irrationales non possunt pertingere ad amandum Deum, neque ad communicationem intellectualis et beatæ vitæ qua Deus vivit. Sic igitur Deus, proprie loquendo, non amat creaturas irrationales amore amicitia, sed amore quasi\* concupiscentiæ, in quantum ordinat eas ad rationales creaturas, et etiam ad se ipsum, non quasi eis indigeat, sed propter suam bonitatem et nostram utilitatem. Concupiscimus enim aliquid et nobis et aliis.

4. Ad quartum dicendum quod nihil prohibet unum et idem secundum aliquid amari, et secundum aliquid odio haberi. Deus autem peccatores in quantum sunt naturæ quædam amat: sic enim et sunt et ab ipso sunt. In quantum vero peccatores sunt non sunt, sed ab esse deficient. Et hoc in eis a Deo non est; unde secundum hoc ab ipso odio habentur.

*articulus 3. utrum Deus æqualiter diligat omnia*

AD TERTIUM sic proceditur:<sup>1</sup> 1. Videtur quod Deus æqualiter diligat omnia. Dicitur enim *Sap.*,<sup>2</sup> *Æqualiter est ei cura de omnibus.* Sed providentia Dei, quam habet de rebus, est ex amore quo amat res. Ergo æqualiter amat omnia.

2. Præterea, amor Dei est ejus essentia. Sed essentia Dei magis et minus non recipit. Ergo nec amor ejus; non igitur quædam aliis magis amat.

3. Præterea, sicut amor Dei se extendit ad res creatas, ita scientia et voluntas. Sed Deus non dicitur scire quædam magis quam alia, neque magis velle. Ergo nec magis quædam aliis diligit.

SED CONTRA est quod dicit Augustinus,<sup>3</sup> *Omnia diligit Deus quæ fecit, et inter ea magis diligit creaturas rationales, et in illis eas amplius quæ sunt membra Unigeniti sui, et multo magis ipsum Unigenitum suum.*

\*Piana: omits quasi

*elling us, that he who is the cause of all by his abounding loving kindness is in ecstasy by his providence for all things that exist.*<sup>o</sup>

2. Though creatures have not been everlasting except in God, yet because they are present to him he knows them from eternity in their own proper nature, and from eternity loves them. So also do we by the forms of things which are in us know things which exist in themselves.

3. Friendship can subsist only between intelligent beings, who are capable of returning love and having intercourse with one another in the interests of life; we can be their well-wishers, in the proper sense of the term, throughout the vicissitudes of good fortune and happiness. Non-rational creatures cannot attain to loving God, or sharing in the intelligence and blessedness of his life. Therefore strictly speaking it is not with the love of friendship that God holds them dear but, as it were, with the love of desire, in that he ordains them for the sake of intelligent creatures and even for himself, not that he needs them, but out of his own goodness and for our benefit. Things can be desired for others, as well as for ourselves.

4. There is nothing to forbid a thing from being loved under one aspect and hated under another. God loves sinners as being real things of nature; such they are, and as such from him. In so far as they are sinners they are unreal and deficient, and as such they are not from God. Under this aspect he holds them in hatred.

*article 3. does God love all things equally?*

THE THIRD POINT:<sup>1</sup> 1. It seems he does. It is said in *Wisdom*, *He provides for all alike.*<sup>2</sup> God's Providence for things comes from the love he bears them. Therefore he loves all equally.

2. Again, God's love is his essence, which does not admit of more or less. Nor then does his love. So he does not love some more than others.

3. Besides, God's love embraces all created things as does his knowledge and will. He is not said to know some more than others, or to will them more. Neither, then, should he be said to love them more.

ON THE OTHER HAND Augustine writes, *God loves all the things that he has made, and among them he loves more deeply intelligent things, and among these more fully those who are members of his only-begotten Son, and much more than these his only-begotten Son himself.*<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup>cf *CG* I, 91. II *Sent.* 26, I ad 2; III, 19, 5, i; 32, 4

<sup>2</sup>*Wisdom* 6, 8

<sup>3</sup>*Super Joannem* 110. PL 35, 1924. *John* 17, 23

<sup>o</sup>Ecstasy an effect of love, 122æ. 28, 3.

RESPONSIO: Dicendum quod cum amare sit velle bonum alicui, duplici ratione potest aliquid magis vel minus amari.

Uno modo ex parte ipsius actus voluntatis, qui est magis vel minus intensus; et sic Deus non magis quædam aliis amat, quia omnia amat uno et simplici actu voluntatis, et semper eodem modo se habente.

Alio modo ex parte ipsius boni, quod aliquis vult amato; et sic dicimur aliquem magis alio amare cui volumus majus bonum, quamvis non magis intensa voluntate; et hoc modo necesse est dicere quod Deus quædam aliis magis amat. Cum enim amor Dei causa bonitatis rerum, ut dictum est,<sup>4</sup> non esset aliquid alio melius, si Deus non vellet uni majus bonum quam alteri.

1. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod dicitur Deo æqualiter esse cura de omnibus, non quia æqualia bona sua cura omnibus dispenset, sed quia ex æquali sapientia et bonitate omnia administrat.

2. Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de intensione amoris ex parte actus voluntatis, qui est divina essentia. Bonum autem quod Deus creaturæ vult non est divina essentia. Unde nihil prohibet illud intendi, vel remitti.

3. Ad tertium dicendum quod intelligere et velle significant solum actum, non autem in sua significatione includunt aliqua objecta ex quorum diversitate possit dici Deus magis vel minus scire aut velle, sicut circa amorem dictum est in corp. art.

articulus 4. an Deus semper magis diligat meliora

AD QUARTUM sic proceditur:<sup>1</sup> 1. Videtur quod Deus non semper magis diligat meliora. Manifestum est enim quod Christus est melior toto genere humano, cum sit Deus et homo. Sed Deus magis dilexit genus humanum quam Christum, quia dicitur *Rom.*,<sup>2</sup> *Proprio Filio suo non pepercit, sed pro nobis omnibus tradidit illum.* Ergo Deus non semper magis diligit meliora.

2. Præterea, angelus est melior homine; unde in *Psalms*,<sup>3</sup> dicitur de homine, *Minuisti eum paulo minus ab angelis.* Sed Deus plus dilexit hominem quam angelum; dicitur enim *Heb.*,<sup>4</sup> *Nusquam angelos apprehendit, sed semen Abrahamæ apprehendit.* Ergo Deus non semper magis diligit meliora.

<sup>1</sup>Art. 2

<sup>2</sup>cf III *Sent.* 31, 2, 3, iii; 32, 5, i-iv

<sup>3</sup>*Romans* 8, 32

<sup>4</sup>*Psalms* 8, 6

<sup>4</sup>*Hebrews* 2, 16

<sup>5</sup>For the inequalities of love as regards both objects and depth within charity see 2azæ. 26, 1 & sqq. The better a thing the more it can engage our love; the closer a thing the more intensely it can be loved. The best things are not always the closest.

<sup>6</sup>Not a bigger or smaller amount in terms of quantity. Do not read as though on a

REPLY: Since loving is willing good to someone, there can be two reasons for a loving more or a loving less, one on the part of the act of will, the other on the part of the good.<sup>a</sup>

First, the activity of willing itself can have degrees of more or less. In this respect God does not love some more than others, but loves all in a single act of will that is always steadily the same.

Secondly, with respect to the good which is willed, we are said to love someone more than another because we will him a greater good, though perhaps not more intensely. Here we have to admit that God loves some more than others, for since his love is the cause of things, as we have noted,<sup>4</sup> one thing would not be better than another but for God willing it more good.<sup>b</sup>

Hence: 1. We speak of God having equal care for all things, not because he dispenses the same blessings on all he looks after, but because he administers all of them with invariable wisdom and goodness.

2. This argument holds with respect to the intensity of love in the activity of will, which is the divine essence. The good that God wills to creatures, however, is not his essence, and the argument shows no reason why that may not be of lesser or greater degree.

3. Understanding and willing denote only the activity of doing so; their very meaning does not imply a disparity between objects, and it is to them we refer when we speak of God knowing or willing some more, some less, in the manner that applies to loving, as explained in this article.

article 4. does God love the better things more?

THE FOURTH POINT:<sup>1</sup> 1. It would not seem so. Christ is certainly better than the whole human race, since he is both God and man. Yet God loved the human race more than Christ, according to *Romans*, *He spared not his own Son, but delivered him up for us all*.<sup>2</sup> Hence God does not always love the better more.

2. Again, an angel is better than a man. The *Psalms*, speaking about man, say, *Thou hast set him a little lower than the angels*.<sup>3</sup> Men were held by God in greater love than angels, for it is written in *Hebrews*, *Never did he take angels, but the seed of Abraham*.<sup>4</sup> Therefore he does not love the better the more.

common substrate one receives a greater accretion than another. For 'good' is an analogical and transcendental concept, which cannot be differentiated by additions from outside. It is diversified by inner variations explained by degrees of participation under the complete causality of the Good. Art. 4 above should be applied in its full strength. For the Platonism of this modulation cf 1azæ. 52, 1. Vol. 22 of this series. Also L. B. Geiger, *La Participation dans la philosophie de S. Thomas*, Paris, 1942.

dilectam. Et sic Deus est totaliter diligendus, quia totum quod ad Deum pertinet homo diligere debet. Alio modo potest intelligi ita quod totalitas referatur ad diligentem. Et sic etiam Deus totaliter diligere debet, quia ex toto posse suo debet homo diligere Deum, et quidquid habet ad Dei amorem ordinare, secundum illud *Deut.*, *Diliges Dominum Deum tuum ex toto corde tuo.*<sup>5</sup> Tertio modo potest intelligi secundum comparisonem diligentis ad rem dilectam, ut scilicet modus diligentis adæquet modum rei dilectæ. Et hoc non potest esse. Cum enim unumquodque intantum diligibile sit in quantum est bonum, Deus, cujus bonitas est infinita, est infinite diligibilis: nulla autem creatura potest Deum infinite diligere, quia omnis virtus creaturæ, sive naturalis sive infusa, est finita.

Et per hoc patet responsio ad objecta. Nam primæ tres objectiones procedunt secundum hunc tertium sensum: ultima autem ratio procedit in sensu secundo.

*articulus 6. utrum divinæ dilectionis sit aliquis modus habendus*

AD SEXTUM sic proceditur:<sup>1</sup> 1. Videtur quod divinæ dilectionis sit aliquis modus habendus. Ratio enim boni consistit in *modo, specie et ordine*, ut patet per Augustinum.<sup>2</sup> Sed dilectio Dei est optimum in homine: secundum illud *Coloss.*, *Super omnia caritatem habete.*<sup>3</sup> Ergo dilectio Dei debet modum habere.

2. Præterea, Augustinus dicit, *Dic mihi, quæso te, quis sit diligendi modus. Vereor enim ne plus minusve quam oportet inflammer desiderio et amore Domini mei.*<sup>4</sup> Frustra autem quæreret modum nisi esset aliquis divinæ dilectionis modus. Ergo est aliquis modus divinæ dilectionis.

3. Præterea, sicut Augustinus dicit, *modus est quem unicuique propria mensura præfigit.*<sup>5</sup> Sed mensura voluntatis humanæ, sicut et actionis exterioris, est ratio. Ergo sicut in exteriori effectu caritatis oportet habere modum a ratione præstitum, secundum illud *Rom.*, *Rationabile obsequium vestrum,*<sup>6</sup> ita etiam ipsa interior dilectio Dei debet modum habere.

SED CONTRA est quod Bernardus dicit, quod *causa diligendi Deum Deus est; modus, sine modo diligere.*<sup>7</sup>

<sup>1</sup>loc cit

<sup>2</sup>*III Sent* 27, 3, 3. *De Caritate* 2 ad 13. *In Rom.* 12, lect. 1

<sup>3</sup>*De Natura Boni contra Manichæos* 3. PL 42, 553

<sup>4</sup>*Colossians* 3, 14

<sup>5</sup>*De Moribus Eccles.* 8. PL 32, 1316

<sup>6</sup>*De Genesi ad Litt.* IV, 3. PL 34, 299

<sup>7</sup>*Romans* 12, 1

<sup>8</sup>*De Diligendo Deum* 1. PL 182, 974

in three different senses. First, in the sense that 'wholly' refers to what is loved, and so God should be loved wholly, because man is bound to love everything that belongs to him. Secondly, as referring to the lover, and here, too, God must be loved wholly, because man is bound to love him with all his might, subordinating all he has to God, as we learn from *Deuteronomy*, *And you shall love the Lord your God with all your heart.*<sup>5</sup> Thirdly, 'wholly' can be taken in terms of a comparison between the lover and the loved, so that the manner of the loving equalled the manner of the beloved. This cannot be in the present question. For since a thing is lovable to the extent that it is good, God, whose goodness is infinite, is infinitely lovable. No created being, however, can love God in this way, because all creaturely power, whether of nature or of grace is finite.

The answers to all the objections should be clear from what has been said. For the first three rest on this third way of understanding 'wholly'; and the *sed contra* takes its stand on the second way.

*article 6. is any measure to be observed in loving God?\**

THE SIXTH POINT:<sup>1</sup> 1. It seems that there is. For, according to Augustine, good consists in *mode, species and order.*<sup>2b</sup> Now loving God is man's best; *Above all things* says St Paul, *have charity.*<sup>3</sup> Therefore the love of God should be moderated or regulated.

2. Moreover, Augustine says, *Tell me, what is the right measure of love? For I am afraid that in my desire and love for my Lord I may be more fervent, or less so, than I should be.*<sup>4</sup> Pointless for him to have asked this, unless there were some measure to be observed in loving God. Therefore there is such a measure.

3. Besides, according to Augustine, *a thing's mode is what its appropriate measure lays down for it.*<sup>5</sup> But the measure which governs man's will, as well as his external activities, is reason. Therefore, just as reason lays down the right mode for charity's external effects, what is called *your reasonable service,*<sup>6</sup> so, too, for the interior love of God.

ON THE OTHER HAND there is Bernard's statement that *the cause of loving God is God; the measure, to love without measure.*<sup>7</sup>

\**modus*, measure or mode. An element in the notion of virtue, connected with idea of its *medium*: cf 1a2ae. 64.

<sup>1</sup>See 1a. 5, 5, note a (Vol. 2, ed. T. McDermott), and 1a. 93, 6, note e (Vol. 13 ed. E. Hill), for remarks on the translation and meaning of this difficult expression of Augustine.

RESPONSIO: Dicendum quod, sicut patet ex inducta auctoritate Augustini,<sup>8</sup> modus importat quandam mensuræ determinationem. Hæc autem determinatione invenitur et in mensura et in mansurato, aliter tamen et aliter. In mensura enim invenitur essentialiter, quia mensura secundum seipsam est determinativa et modificativa aliorum: in mensuratis autem invenitur mensura secundum aliud, idest in quantum attingunt mensuram. Et ideo in mansura nihil potest accipi immodificatum. Sed res mensurata est immodificata nisi mensuram attingat, sive deficiat sive excedat.

In omnibus autem appetibilibus et agibilibus mensura est finis: quia eorum quæ appetimus et agimus oportet propriam rationem ex fine accipere, ut patet per Philosophum, in *Physic.*<sup>9</sup> Et ideo finis secundum seipsum habet modum, ea vero quæ sunt ad finem habent modum ex eo quod sunt fini proportionata. Et ideo, sicut Philosophus dicit, in *Polit.*, *appetitus finis in omnibus artibus est absque fine et termino; eorum autem quæ sunt ad finem est aliquis terminus.*<sup>10</sup> Non enim medicus imponit aliquem terminum sanitati, sed facit eam perfectam quantumcumque potest, sed medicinæ imponit terminum; non enim dat tantum de medicina quantum potest, sed secundum proportionem ad sanitatem; quam quidem proportionem si medicina excederet, vel ab ea deficeret, esset immoderata.

Finis autem omnium actionum humanarum et affectionum est Dei dilectio, per quam maxime attingimus ultimum finem, ut supra dictum est.<sup>11</sup> Et ideo in dilectione Dei non potest accipi modus sicut in re mensurata, ut sit in ea accipere plus et minus; sed sicut invenitur modus in mensura, in qua non potest esse excessus, sed quanto plus attingitur regula tanto melius est. Et ita quanto plus Deus diligitur tanto est dilectio melior.

1. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illud quod est per se potius est eo quod est per aliud. Et ideo bonitas mensuræ, quæ per se habet modum, potior est quam bonitas mensurati, quod habet modum per aliud. Et sic etiam caritas, quæ habet modum sicut mensura, præeminet aliis virtutibus, quæ habent modum sicut mensurata.

2. Ad secundum dicendum quod Augustinus ibidem<sup>12</sup> subjungit quod modus diligendi Deum est ut ex toto corde diligatur, idest ut diligatur quantumcumque potest diligi. Et hoc pertinet ad modum qui convenit mensuræ.

3. Ad tertium dicendum quod affectio illa cujus objectum subjacet iudicio rationis est ratione mensuranda. Sed objectum divinæ dilectionis, quod est Deus, excedit iudicium rationis. Et ideo non mensuratur ratione,

<sup>8</sup>De Genesi ad litt. IV, 3. PL 34, 299

<sup>9</sup>Physics II, 9. 200a32

<sup>10</sup>Politics I, 3. 1257b26

<sup>11</sup>2a2æ. 17, 6; 23, 6

REPLY: As we saw earlier on,<sup>8</sup> Augustine uses the word 'mode' to signify a certain determinate measure. Now this is to be found both in the measure itself and in the thing measured, but in different ways. In the measure itself essentially, because a measure is by nature something that determines and modifies other things; in the things measured, however, only as derived from something else, in other words, in so far as they conform to the measure itself. Hence, in the measure itself there can be nothing that is not rightly modified. Not so, however, for the thing measured, because it is possible for it to fail, by defect or excess, to conform to its measure.

Now the measure that is relevant where there is a question of desiring or doing anything is the end in view: because, as Aristotle shows in the *Physics*,<sup>9</sup> it is from the end in view that shapes our desires and actions. Hence while the end of itself has 'mode', things subordinate to the end have it from being proportioned to the end. Accordingly, as Aristotle points out in the *Politics*, *in all the arts the desire for the end is itself without end or limit; but in things subordinated to the end there is a limit.*<sup>10</sup> Thus a doctor does not impose any limit to health, but promotes it as far as possible; but he does limit the medicine he prescribes for he does not give as much of it as he can, but only so much as is needed for health. To do otherwise, by giving too much or too little, would be to fail in keeping the proper measure in the proportion of medicine to health.

Now, as already stated,<sup>11</sup> the end of all human actions and affections is the love of God, by which above all we attain him, our ultimate end. And so, in the love of God there can be no such thing as any measure, in the sense of any more or less, such as we find in things subject to measurement, but only in the sense that it is found in the measure itself, where there cannot be any excess, and where the more fully the rule is attained, the better is it attained. Hence where the love of God is concerned, the more we love, the better we love.

Hence: 1. What is *per se* is stronger than what is *per aliud*. Hence the goodness of the measure, which has its mode from itself, is fuller than that of the measure which derives its mode from another. And so charity, which has mode in the sense that a measure has it, surpasses the other virtues, which have it after the manner of something measured.

2. In the same passage<sup>12</sup> Augustine adds that in loving God the measure to be observed is to love him with our whole heart, in other words as much as he can be loved. And this is question of the 'mode' which belongs to the measure.

3. An effective act whose object comes under the judgement of reason is to be measured by reason. But the object of divine love, which is God, is

<sup>12</sup>De Moribus Eccles. 8. PL 32, 1316



sed rationem excedit. Nec est simile de interiori actu caritatis et exterioribus actibus. Nam interior actus habet rationem finis, quia ultimum bonum hominis consistit in hoc quod anima Deo inhæreat, secundum illud *Psalm.*, *Mihi adhærere Deo bonum est.*<sup>13</sup> Exteriores autem actus sunt sicut ad finem. Et ideo sunt commensurandi et secundum caritatem et secundum rationem.

*articulus 7. utrum sit magis meritorium diligere inimicum quam amicum*

AD SEPTIMUM sic proceditur:<sup>1</sup> I. Videtur quod magis meritorium sit diligere inimicum quam amicum. Dicitur enim *Matt.*, *Si diligitis eos qui vos diligunt, quam mercedem habebitis?*<sup>2</sup> Diligere ergo amicum non meretur mercedem. Sed diligere inimicum meretur mercedem, ut ibidem<sup>3</sup> ostenditur. Ergo magis est meritorium diligere inimicos quam diligere amicos.

2. Præterea, tanto aliquid est magis meritorium quanto ex majori caritate procedit. Sed diligere inimicum est perfectorum filiorum Dei, ut Augustinus dicit.<sup>4</sup> Diligere autem amicum est etiam caritatis imperfectæ. Ergo majoris meriti est diligere inimicum quam diligere amicum.

3. Præterea, ubi est major conatus ad bonum ibi videtur esse majus meritum quia *unusquisque propriam mercedem accipiet secundum suam laborem*, ut dicitur *I Cor.*<sup>5</sup> Sed majori conatu indiget homo ad hoc quod diligat inimicum quam ad hoc quod diligat amicum, quia difficilius est. Ergo videtur quod diligere inimicum sit magis meritorium quam diligere amicum.

SED CONTRA est quia illud quod est melius est magis meritorium. Sed melius est diligere amicum, quia melius est diligere meliorem; amicus autem, qui amat, est melior quam inimicus, qui odit. Ergo diligere amicum est magis meritorium quam diligere inimicum.

RESPONSIO: Dicendum quod ratio diligendi proximum ex caritate Deus est, sicut supra dictum est.<sup>6</sup> Cum ergo quæritur quid sit melius, vel magis meritorium, utrum diligere amicum vel inimicum, dupliciter istæ dilectiones comparari possunt: uno modo, ex parte proximi qui diligitur. Primo quidem modo dilectio amici præeminet dilectioni inimici. Quia amicus et melior est et magis conjunctus; unde est materia magis conveniens dilectioni; et propter hoc actus dilectionis super hanc materiam transiens melior

<sup>13</sup>*Psalms* 72, 28

<sup>1</sup>cf III *Sent.* 30, 3; 4 ad 3. *De Caritate* 8

<sup>2</sup>*Matthew* 5, 46

<sup>3</sup>ibid 44, 45

<sup>4</sup>*I Corinthians* 3, 8

<sup>4</sup>*Enchiridion* 73. PL 40, 266

<sup>6</sup>25, 1 above

beyond reason, and therefore is not measured by it. Nor is there a parallel between the interior and exterior acts of charity: for the interior act has the character of end, the ultimate good of man consisting in the soul's clinging to God, according to the verse of the psalm, *It is good for me to cleave to my God.*<sup>13</sup> External acts, on the other hand, have the character of things directed towards an end, and therefore are to be measured both according to charity and according to reason.

*article 7. is it more meritorious to love an enemy than to love a friend?*<sup>a</sup>

THE SEVENTH POINT:<sup>1</sup> I. It would seem to be more meritorious to love an enemy. For in *Matthew* we read, *If you love those who love you, what reward have you?*<sup>2</sup> So, to love a friend does not merit a reward, but to love an enemy does, as the same gospel tells us.<sup>3</sup> Therefore, it is more meritorious to love enemies than friends.

2. Moreover, the greater the charity that prompts it the more meritorious the act. Now, Augustine teaches that loving an enemy is a mark of the *perfect sons of God*,<sup>4</sup> while loving a friend is an act of imperfect charity. Therefore it is more meritorious to love an enemy than a friend.

3. Besides, the greater the effort to do good the greater the merit, for, as St Paul says, *each shall receive his wages according to his labour.*<sup>5</sup> But because it is more difficult, a man has to make a greater effort to love an enemy than to love a friend, consequently it would seem more meritorious.

ON THE OTHER HAND the better the action the more meritorious it is.<sup>b</sup> Now loving a friend falls under this head, because it is better to love someone who is better, and a friend, who loves us, is better than an enemy, who hates us. Therefore, it is more meritorious to love a friend than an enemy.

REPLY: As was said earlier on,<sup>6</sup> charity's reason for loving our neighbour is God. Therefore when the question arises as to whether it is better, or more meritorious, to love a friend or an enemy, we can resolve it in two ways: either from the side of the loved one; or by looking at the reason for loving him. By the former test, the love of a friend surpasses that of an enemy. The reason is that a friend is better and is closer to us, and hence more favourable material for love; and loving which bears on such subject

<sup>a</sup>cf 2a2æ. 26 above, on the priorities of charity and especially art. 7.

<sup>b</sup>This presupposes the teaching on merit elaborated in 1a2æ. 114. Vol. 30, ed. C. Ernst. The difficulty of the meritorious act done out of charity may be an indication that the love is stronger (the widow's mite is an example, cf 1a, 95, 4); but this is not necessarily so. The influence of Jansenism has tended to make the axiom, *agere contra*, an all-embracing rule of the spiritual life. Note below, art. 8 ad 3.